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Abstract
Firing costs are often blamed for unemployment.  This paper investigates this
well spread belief.  The main points are two.  First, firing costs are modelled in
an efficiency wage model to capture their effects on employment through wages.
 Secondly, dismissal conflicts are modelled explicitly.  In the context of
imperfectly observable effort, a double moral hazard problem can arise and in
turn firing costs reduced employment because they increase the rent to be paid
to workers.  The determinants of the double moral hazard problem such as the
imprecise definition of dismissal causes are analysed.  The main policy
conclusion is that focus should move onto the clarification of the different
causes of dismissal to minimise the room of interpretation.  If so, then high
enough severance payments in case of “unfair” dismissals can actually have a
punishment role and prevent the double moral hazard problem.
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FiringcostsareoftenblamedforunemploymentinEurope(seeO ECD (19 9 5), forinstance).
T heaim ofthis paperis toinvestigatethiswidespreadbelieffrom atheoreticalpointof





D espitetheprevalentideaofthe(negative) e¤ectof…ringcostsonemployment, spe-
ciallyamongpolicymakersandemployers, thereareverydi¤erentviewsamongeconomists
dependingonthemodelused. Forinstance, accordingtotheinsider-outsidertheoryput
forward by L indbeckand Snower(19 88), …ringcosts are asourceofmarketpowerfor
incumbentworkers (the insiders) vis-a-vis theunemployed (theoutsiders). Insiders use
theirmarketpowertoexerciseupward pressureon theirwages andtherebygenerating
unemployment. A ccordingtothisview, thehigherthe…ringcosts, thehighertheunem-
ployment.
A completelydi¤erentviewof…ringcosts istheonebyL azear(19 9 0). H eshowsthat
ifmarketsareperfectandcomplete, then‡exiblewagescanundoallthee¤ectsof…ring
costs and, therefore, …ringcosts areneutralonemployment. W orkers payex-anteafee
whichis equaltotheseverancepaymenttheygetincasetheyare…red. Iftheykeep the




















thesehelp …rms tocrediblycommittomorestableemploymentpolicies inanuncertain
environment.
T hesethreeviews exposedabovehaveradicallydi¤erentideas of…ringcosts. O ne
couldsummarisecrudelythat…ringcostsare“bad” accordingtothe…rstview, “neutral”
accordingtothesecondvieworeven“good” accordingtothethirdviewsincetheycan
beanoptimalinstrumentfor…rms. Consequently, thesethreeframeworks summariseall
possiblee¤ectsof…ringcostsoveremployment. T hemodelpresentedhereisane¢ciency
wagemodelwheredismissalcon‡ictsarecostly. A s itwillbeseen, modelling…ringcosts
inthiswayallowstointegratethethreedi¤erentviewsmentionedabove.
M ostoftheexistingworkon …ringcosts focuses on labourdemandmodels andthe
onlytypeofdismissals consideredareredundancies2. T hesemodels areveryusefulfor
understandingthee¤ectsof…ringcostsonthedynamicfunctioningofthelabourmarket.
H owever, thee¤ectsonaggregateemploymentareambiguousandremaininpartialequi-
librium. T heimplicitassumptionoflabourdemandmodels is thatwages areexogenous
anddonotchangeinthepresenceof…ringcosts3. Inourmodel, wages areendogenous
and…ringexogenous. Inthisway, themodelhighlightsanotherdimensionof…ringcosts
which is notcapturedbylabourdemandmodels. Tofocus onthee¤ects of…ringcosts
onthewage-settingisparticularlyimportantforthoseunemploymentmodels inwhichin
thelong-runtheunemploymentrateisdeterminedentirelybylong-runsupplyfactors(see
L ayardetal. (19 9 1)).
T here is acommonlyheld ideathat…ringcosts arehighbecausedismissalcon‡icts
involvelargeadministrativeand legalcosts andthatthese leadtohigherlabourcosts.
A lthoughthis pointis oftenmade, itis usuallymodeledinasimplisticway: …ringcosts
paid by …rms areassumedtobehigherthan the indemnitythat…rms havetopayto
workers4. ButthisisnotactuallythecaseinmostEuropeancountries. Instead, thesource
ofhigher…ringcostshastodomorewiththefactthatthelegislationgenerallysetsahigher
severancepayforcases taken tocourtanddeclared “unfair” than forthoseconsidered
“fair” bycourt. T hesetermsarede…nedfrom theworker’sperspective. A n“unfair” case
iswhenthecourtconsidersthatthe…rm iswrongandthereforetheworkermustreceive
the(“unfair”) …ringcostbecauseitisanunjustdismissal. T he“fair” severancepayment
is thedefaultindemnityforadismissal. W henacase is takentocourtand is declared
“fair”, thecourtconsidersthatthe…rm isrightandtheworkersimplyreceivesthedefault
2See, forexample, B entolilaand Bertola(19 9 0), B entolilaand Saint-Paul(19 9 4), B ertola(19 9 0 and
19 9 2) andN ickell(19 7 8).
3A nexemptionofthis is B ertola(19 9 0).
4SeeB urda(19 9 2) foramodelofthis sort.
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indemnity. Forinstance, in Spain5, thecostofaredundancydeclared“fair” is 20 days’
wages pereachyearworkedwith amaximum of12 months’wages. Butifthecase is
declared“unfair”, thecostis morethandouble, 45 days’wages peryearworkedwitha
maximumof42 months. T his “unfair” ratealsoappliestodisciplinarycases6.
Inthis paper, weexplicitlymodeldismissalcon‡icts andderivetheircost. Con‡icts
betweenemployersandemployees canariseforverydi¤erentreasons. Ingeneral, when-
ever…rms facearedundancy, theywanttousedisciplinarydismissals inordertoavoid
paying…ringcosts. W emodel…ringcostsinacontextwhereworkere¤ortisnotperfectly
observable. T his actuallyprovides arationalefortheexistenceofworkers’righttosue
theiremployers incaseofdisagreement. In suchacontext, workers canbeinaweaker
positionbecause…rmscangetawaywiththeuseofdisciplinarydismissalswheneverthey




thedi¢cultyinobservingworkere¤ort. A s itwillbediscussed, adoublemoralhazard




employment. A s itwillbediscussedattheendofthepaper, thesolutiondoesnotneces-
sarilyimplytheeliminationof…ringcosts. R ather, whatwillappeartobeimportantis
thegapbetweentheseverancepaymentforcasesconsidered“unfair” andthose“fair”.




Inourmodel, …rmswillbeara…ringcostthatis exactlythesameas theindemnity
receivedbytheworker. A s mentioned, this is thecaseformostEuropeancountries. In
countries inwhichtheadministrativeapprovalprocessesareverycomplex8 , manyofthe
cases aresettledbytheworkerandthe…rm outofcourt, preciselytoavoidthesecosts.
T herefore, again, …rmsdonotbearahighercostthantheindemnityreceivedbyworkers.
T heworkerreceivesasettlementwhichamountliesbetweenthelegalseverancepayment
andthe(expected) costhadthecasegonetocourt. In this sense, the…ringcosts due
5See G rubb and W ells (19 9 3) and O ECD (19 9 9 ) foracomparison ofthese indemnities in di¤erent
O ECD countries.
6Inthiscase, thedi¤erenceincostsofbetweena“unfair” anda“fair” caseisextreme: 45 days’wages
peryearworkedif“unfair” versusnocompensationif“fair”.
7 SeeB ooth(19 9 6and19 9 7 ) foramodelof…ringcosts inunionisedsectorsoftheeconomy.





T herestofthepaperisorganisedasfollows. First, …ringcostsaredescribed, andtheir
implications for(e¢ciency) wages andemploymentarederived. In thelastsection, we
discusssomepolicyimplications.
2 Themodel
T hemodelis aversionoftheshirkingmodelofShapiroand Stiglitz (19 84) with …ring
costs. A s in ShapiroandStiglitz, aworker’s e¤ortis notperfectlyobservableandthere
is adetection technology thatcatches shirkingworkers (nevererroneously) with some
probability q (whereq < 1). W henaworkeris foundshirking, he is …redandbecomes
unemployed. W orkersalsohaveanexogenousprobability, b;ofbeingseparatedfromtheir
jobforredundancyreasons9 . Inthenextsectionwedescribehow…ringcostsaremodeled.
2.1 R edundanciesanddisciplinarydismissals incon‡ict
M ostindustrialised countries have a job protection legislation frameworkthatprotects
workersagainstredundancies. T heideaisthataredundancyisanexogenouseventtothe








somechancethat…rms cangetawaywithsuchstrategy10. T herightforworkers tosue
employersincaseofdisagreementcancompensateforthisimperfection. B utthen, similarly
to…rms, workerswilldenyanyreasons fordisciplinarydismissaltogetacompensation
based on unjustgrounds. In such acontext, both truedisciplinary cases and hidden
redundanciesarrivetocourtasdisciplinarycases. Court’sdecisionsarebasedonwhatever
evidence(ifany) ispresentedbytheagents, whichisnotperfectlycorrelatedwithreality
giventheinformationproblem. So, ingeneral, courtsarenotabletoperfectlydistinguish
betweentruedisciplinarycasesandhiddenredundancies. T hus, theresolutionbyathird
partywilltendtobeimperfectgiventheinformationproblem.
9 T hetermsadverseeconomicshocksandredundanciesareusedinterchangeablyhere.




couldbemistakenlyconsidered infavouroftheworker(i.e. “unfair”) andsomehidden
redundanciescouldbemistakenlydeclaredinfavourofthe…rm (i.e. “fair”) bycourt. In
otherwords, inthe…rstcase, workersarecompensatedwhentheyshouldnot. A ndinthe
secondcase, …rmsavoidpaying…ringcostswhentheyshouldhavepaidthem.
W ede…nem astheprobabilitythata(true)disciplinarydismissalismistakenlydeclared




W ede…ne z astheprobabilitythata(hidden)redundancyisdeclared“unfair”, where
z < 1 giventheinformationproblem. T hatis, withprobability (1¡ z ), thereis acourt
mistakeandredundanciesarecostlesstothe…rm. O nlywithprobability z , theworkeris
compensatedforaredundancycase.
Firmscanbetterprovethata(true) disciplinarydismissalis indeeddisciplinarythan
toprovethataredundancyisadisciplinarycase. T hatis, theprobabilitythatadismissal
takentocourtiscostlesstothe…rmishigherwhenitisa(true)disciplinarydismissalthan
whenitisa(hidden)redundancy, orthatz ¸m :Inotherwords, theprobabilitythatthe
caseisdeclaredinfavouroftheworkerislowerwhenthecaseisa(true)disciplinarycase.
W eassumethatthelegislation …xes aseverancepaymentofcforredundancies and
aseverancepaymentofC ifthecase is taken tocourtand is declared “unfair”, where
c· C . T hen, giventhedoublemoralhazardproblem, the…rm’s expected…ringcostof
a(true) disciplinarydismissalis m C andofa(hidden) redundancyis z C . Table1 below
summarises…ringcostsdescribed11.
Table1: Firingcostsforredundanciesanddisciplinarycases
R eality D eclaration ExpectedCost
of…rm ofworker for…rm
R edundancy R edundancy accepts c
R edundancy D isciplinary denies z C
D isciplinary D isciplinary denies m C
Tosum up, giventhecontextdescribedabove, thereis alwaysan incentivefor…rms
todeclareredundancies asdisciplinarycasesandfortheworkertodenyanydisciplinary
case. A furtherdiscussionofthisdoublemoralhazardproblem isdoneinthelastsection
ofthepaper.
11 L et’s assumethatin caseofredundancies presentedas disciplinarycases, the…rm can nevershow
evidenceofthecaseandthecostiszC . Inthecaseofrealdisciplinarycases, ifthe…rm isabletoproof




optimale¤ortonthejob. W orkersareriskneutral12. T heirinstantaneousutilityfunction
is: U(w ;e) = w ¡e; wherew is thewageand e is thee¤ort. W orkers e¤ortchoices are
discrete. Iftheyshirk, theyexpendzeroe¤ortandproductioniszero. T hee¤ortrequired
toperform inthejobis e > 0 .
W orkerschoosethelevelofe¤ortthatmaximisestheirutilityactualisedatrater. B y
V iE;wedenotethepresentdiscountedutilityofanemployedworkerwhenshirking(i=S)or
nonshirking(i= N ). Firmswanttoo¤eracontractsuchthatworkersexpendtheoptimal
e¤ort. Inwhatfollows, thecondition underwhichaworkerwillchoosenottoshirk is
studied(thenon-shirkingcondition, N SC ).
W henaworkerdoesnotshirk, hegetsautilityequalto:
rV NE = w ¡e + b(VU + z C ¡V NE ) (1)
whileiftheworkerdecidestoshirkhisutilityis:
rV SE = w + b(VU + z C ¡V SE)+ q(VU + m C ¡V SE) (2)
A s inShapiroandStiglitz (19 84), shirkingsavesthecurrentdisutilityofe¤ortbutit
impliesahigherriskofbecomingunemployed. T hisriskisproportionaltotheprobability
ofbeingcaughtshirking(q). Firingcostsalsoin‡uencethee¤ortdecisionherebecauseof
theimperfectcourtdecisions. W ithprobabilitym ; shirkingworkersmaybecompensated
withaseverancepayment. T hisreducesthecostofshirking.
T heworkerwillchoosetoprovideane¤orte; ifandonlyifV NE ¸V SE . W ecanwrite
thisconditionusingequations(1) and(2) andgettheN SC informofutilities:
V SE ¡VU ¸ eq + m C ´K (3)
T his condition states thatinordertoprovideincentives, thepunishmentoflosinga
jobmustbeatleastequaltotheopportunitycostofshirking, denotedbyK . Substituting
thisconditioninequation(1), wegettheincentivecompatiblewage:
w ¸e¡bz C + rVu+ K (r + b)´ bw (4)
In this wageequation, wecan distinguish between thereservationwage (…rstthree
terms)andtherentlinkedtotheincentiveproblem (lastterm). ForC = 0 , thiscondition
isthesameas intheoriginalShapiroandStiglitz (19 84). Inordertoprovideincentives,
wagesneedtoexceedthereservationwagebyarent, K:T hisrentis proportionaltothe
opportunitycostofnotshirkingweightedbytheterm (r + b). T hehigherthediscount
rate, themoreaworkervalues thesavingofe¤orttoday. T hehighertheprobabilityof
12Foramodelof…ringcostswhereworkersareriskaverse, seeBooth(19 9 7 ).
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being…redforotherreasonsthan(truly) shirkingcases(i.e. shocks), themorecostlyitis
toexpende¤orttoday.
ForC > 0 , wecandistinguishtwotypesofe¤ectsof…ringcosts: thosedirectlyrelated
withtheincentiveproblemandthosethatarenot. Firingcostsa¤ecttheincentiveproblem
becausetotheextentthat(truly)disciplinarydismissalsaredeclared“unfair” (i.e., m > 0 ),
legalseverancepaymentsreducethepunishmentassociatedwithbeing…redwhencaught
shirking. T his impliesthat…rmshavetopayhigherrents inordertopreventshirking, as
canbeseen intheabovenon-shirkingcondition (seeequation (3)). T his e¤ectof…ring
costshasthesame‡avourasthatintheinsider-outsidertheory, where…ringcostsincrease
marketpowerofincumbentworkers.
A tthesametime, independentlyoftheincentiveproblem, theintroductionofmandated
severancepaymentsallowstheemployertoreducethewageexactlybythesameproportion
thatthepresentdiscountedutilityofanemployeeisincreased, withouta¤ectingincentives.
T hiscanbeseeninthe…ringcostelementofthereservationwage(seeequation(4)). T he
ideais thatlowerwagestoday, togetherwithcompensationwhenbeing…redforshocks,
leavethepresentdiscountedutilityofbeingemployedunchanged. T hise¤ectof…ringcosts
isthesameasthatproposedbyL azear(19 9 0)13.
A lthoughthislastmechanism isnotdirectlyrelatedwiththeincentiveproblem, ithas
veryinterestinglinkswithe¢ciencywages inmodelsinwhich…ringisnotexogenous. A s
mentioned, in thestandarde¢ciencywagemodelwithoutseverancepayments, workers
arepaida“…ringpremium” inordertopreventshirkingbecauseexpendinge¤ortismore
costlythehighertheprobabilityofbeing…redduetoadverseeconomicshocks. W hena
severancepaymentis imposed, …rms facetwooppositee¤ects inthepresenceofshocks:
they have topay an implicit…ringcosttoavoid shirking(the “…ringpremium”), but
theycanlowerwagesbecauseworkersarebeingcompensatedwhen…redafterashock14.
A nimportantfurtherinsightismadebySaint-Paul(19 9 6): inadynamice¢ciencywage
model, itis inthe interestof…rms tovoluntarily includeaseverancepayinthelabour
contractthattheyo¤er. T his isonepossiblewayforthe…rmtocrediblycommittohave
amorestableemploymentpolicywhenfacingshocks, whichthenallowsthe…rmtoreduce




13So, form=0 , thetwomodelshavethesamepredictions(seesection(2.4)wherethemarketequilibrium
issolved).
14SeeKatsimi (19 9 8) foramoredetailedderivationofthis mechanism inafullystochastice¢ciency
wagemodel.
15Ifm=0 , …rmswouldo¤er…ringcostsinthepresentmodel. Inthecaseofm=0 , forC =e=qthetwo
modelswouldcoincide. Still, inthepresentmodel, severancepaymentsaresetlegallywhileinSaint-Paul
theyareendogenous. SeeB ooth(19 9 7 ) foradiscussionwherethelevelofmandated…ringcostsmaydi¤er
fromthosebargained.
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B acktothe N on-ShirkingCondition, ifacontractsatis…es the N SC , thatis, ifthe
workerispaidatleastbw or, ifbeingunemployedisasu¢cientlylargepunishment(V SE >
VU ), theworkerwillchoosetoexpendthee¤orte. W ede…neVE astheexpectedutilityin
equilibrium. T he…rm choosestheminimum wageatwhichtheworkerwillnotshirk, so
thatinequilibriumtheN SC isbindingandVE = V NE = V SE:
2.3 H iringdecisions
A ll…rms inthemodelareidenticalandin…nitelylived. T heychoseemploymentsoasto
maximisetheexpectedpresentvalueofpro…tsdiscountedatrater. W edenoteby¦ the
presentdiscountedvalueofmarginalpro…ts. W ehave:
r¦ = f0(L)¡w ¡b(z C + ¦ )
wheref(L) istheproductionfunctionwithf0(L) > 0 andf00(L) < 0:
Inthepresenceof…ringcosts, themarginalcostofhiringaworkerisgivenbythewage
plusthefutureexpectedcostofbeing…red. T hereisnocostofpostingvacancies, so…rms
hireworkerstothepointwherethemarginalpro…tiszero, i.e. ¦ = 0 . L abourdemandin
steadystateisgivenby:
f0(L) = w + bz C (5)




…nds itoptimaltoo¤erthegoingwageratherthan adi¤erentwage. T hekeymarket
variablethatdetermines…rm individualbehaviouristhepresentvalueoftheutilityofan




G iventhattheN SC is satis…ed, wehavethatinequilibrium:
rVU = aK (6)
N ow, substitutingequation (6) in equation (4), wegetthee¢ciencywagecurve in
equilibrium:
8
bw = e¡bz C + K (r + b+ a) (7 )
Inequilibrium, theincentivecompatiblewageishigherthehighertheexitratefromun-
employment. T hisresultisalsofoundinShapiroandStiglitz(19 84). T herentlinkedwith
theincentiveproblemisweightedbya becausethehighera;thelessbecomingunemployed
isapenalty.
W ederiveemployment, L, fromthesteadystate‡owscondition: insteadystatein‡ows
tounemploymentaregivenbybL. O ut‡owsaregivenbya(N ¡L), whereN isthetotal
ofworkersintheeconomy. T hus,





Combiningequations (5) and(7 ), wegetthattheequilibrium out‡owrateofunem-
ployment, a¤, isgivenby:
f0(L) = e¡bz C + K (r + b+ a¤)+ bz C (9 )
In equation (9 ), itcanbeseenthatthesecondtypeofe¤ectofseverancepayments
mentionedbeforecanbefullyundone: thesecondandthefourthelementofthisequation
cancelout. T heideaisthatifmarketsarecompleteandperfect, and…ringcostsarefully
transferredtoworkers, thentheyareneutralonemploymentbecausethewageisreduced
bythesameproportionastheincreasedshadowcostoflabour(seeL azear(19 9 0)).
H owever, inthismodel, evenif…ringcostsarefullyreceivedbyworkers, theyarenot
neutralbecausetheya¤ecttherent, K . T hee¤ectsofseverancepaymentsonthee¢ciency
wagesettinghavenocounteractinge¤ectsthroughthenon-wagecomponentoftheshadow
costoflabour. T herefore, thewagescheduleis shiftedtotheleftand ithas anegative
impacte¤ectonemployment. Itis interestingtonotethatevenifthewageissetbythe
…rm, itis notpossibletofullyendogenizetheseverancepayments intheworkers’wage.
A smentioned, this resultis duetothepresenceofadoublemoralhazardproblem that
canonlyberesolvedimperfectlybyathirdparty. T hisimpliesthat…ringcostshaveareal
e¤ectbecausetheyreducethecostofshirking.
T heaggregateN SC canalsobewritten intermsoftheunemploymentrate, u. R e-
placingequation(8) intoequation(7 ), weget:
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bw = e¡bz C + K "r + bN
N ¡L
#
= e¡bz C + K [r + b=u]
whereu= (N ¡L)=N .
T his expression canberepresented in the (w ; L) space. Figure 1 shows thelabour


















Inthemodelpresentedabove, theexistenceofjob protectionlegislation inacontextin
whichworkere¤ortis notperfectlyobservable implied that…ringcosts hadanegative
e¤ectonemployment. A sexplained, theproblem insuchasystem isthatthereisalways
an incentiveforcon‡ictbetweenemployerandemployee, i.e. fortheemployertoclaim
anydismissaltobedisciplinaryandfortheworkertodenyanydisciplinarycase. T his, in
turn, implies imperfectresolutionsbythirdparties. T hegoalofthis sectionistodiscuss
somepossiblepolicyimplicationsderivedfromthemodelabove.
T hemechanismthatgeneratessuchdoublemoralhazardproblem isthat, for…rms, the
expectedcostofaredundancyishigherthantheexpectedcostofdeclaringitadisciplinary




redundancyonlywithprobability z . A nditisabletodiscovertruedisciplinarycasesonly
withprobability (1¡m ). T herefore, …rms …nd itworth ittodeclaredisciplinarycases
whenfacingredundancies if:
c¸ z C (10)
If…rmsmisusedisciplinarycases, thenworkershaveanincentivetodenyanyofthem
because:
m C ¸0 (11)
Ifthesetwoconditionsaremet, thenthedoublemoralhazardisanequilibrium. T hat
is, alldismissalsaretakentocourtasdisciplinarycases. A sshownintheprevioussection,
insuchacase, …ringcostsarenotneutralonemployment. A scanbeseenfromconditions
(10) and(11), policiesthatconcentrateonundoingthedoublemoralhazardproblem do
notnecessarilyimplythecompleteremovalofseverancepayments.
A smentioned, ingeneral, mostemploymentprotectionlegislationsystems sethigher
severance payments forcases beingdeclared “unfair” than forthose considered “fair”.
T he ideabehindthis goes in therightdirection in thesensethatittries topunish for
unjustdismissals. ForlargeenoughC , theincentiveof…rmstocheatcouldbeundone(see
equation(10))andtherefore, therewouldbenodoublemoralhazard17 . Insuchacase, high
severancepayments for“unfair” dismissals haveapunishmentrolefor…rmswhowould
usedisciplinarydismissalswhenfacingaredundancy. H owever, suchapolicymaynotbe
su¢cient. IfC fails tobehighenough, itmotivates cheatingfrom bothagentswhich in
turngeneratesimperfectcourtdecisions. A ndtheresultingaveragecostof…ringishigher
17 Ifthe…rm does notcheat, thentheworkerdoes notcheateithersincesuch strategywouldbeself-
revealing.
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becausesomedismissalsarepaidatthe“unfair” rate. M oreover, thisdoesnotseemtobe
themoste¢cientpolicysinceitdoesnothaveanypunishmentrolefortheworkerwhen
hedeniestruedisciplinarycases.
A moree¢cientpolicywouldbeonethatpunishesanyagentfoundlying. T hatis, on
theonehand, tosetaseverancepaymentthat…rmshavetopay, C F , whenthecourtcatches




R eality D eclaration ExpectedCost
of…rm ofworker for…rm forworker
R edundancy R edundancy accepts c
R edundancy D isciplinary denies z C F
D isciplinary D isciplinary denies m C w
U ndersuchapolicy, takingm and z asgiven, truth-tellingofbothagents isanequi-
librium ifthefollowingtwoconditionsaresatis…ed:
c¡z C F ·0
and
¡m C w ·0
N otethatforanygiven m and z ; ahighenoughgap betweenseverancepaymentsfor
casesdeclared“unfair” andcasesdeclared“fair”, thatis foralargeC F ¡c, andforany
positivepenaltytotheworker, thatisC w , theaboveconditionswouldhold.
T hispolicyhighlightsthatforanemploymentprotectionsystemtowork, speciallywhen







employmentwhile in othercontexts …ringcosts have noe¤ecton employment. A lso,
12
in someotherenvironments, …ringcosts areactually instruments chosenvoluntarilyby
…rms. Inthis paper, wehaveproposedamodelthatstresses thatitis notjustthelevel
ofseverance payments whatmatters, butawiderviewofemploymentprotection. In








T hemainpolicyconclusionsaretwo. First, tosetagapwideenoughbetweenseverance
paymentsforcasesdeclared“unfair” andcasesdeclared“fair”. Second, anyagentcaught
lyingshouldbepunished. Inourmodel, di¤erentseverancepayments shouldbesetfor
hiddenredundancies declared“unfair” andfortrulydisciplinarycasesdeclared“unfair”.
W ithsuchapolicy, thedi¤erent…ringcostsfor“unfair” dismissalshaveapunishmentrole
forbothemployerandemployeeand, therefore, its implementationwouldeliminatethe
doublemoralhazardproblem.
In this paperwehave explored one possible reason behind imperfectcourtresolu-
tionsandtheirimplicationforemployment. T hatis, thefactthate¤ort, whichmotivates
disciplinarydismissals, is notperfectlyobservable. T hereareotherreasonswhycourt’s
decisionscouldbeimperfect. Inourcontext, thereistheproblem ofde…ningadismissal
caseprecisely. Forinstance, inthecaseofredundancies, itisdi¢culttosetunquestionably
“howbad” theeconomicsituationofa…rmmustbeinordertohaveanobjectivereason
to…reaworker. Similarly, fordisciplinarydismissals, itisdi¢culttosetthedegreeofthe
worker’sfaultthatjusti…esdismissal. T his leavesroom forinterpretationimplyingagain
thatresolutionswilltendtobeimperfect. O therpossiblereasonsarerelatedwithwhatthe
legislationconsidersasan“unfair” dismissalitself, somethingthatdi¤ersacrosscountries
(seeO ECD (19 9 9 )). O r, howcomplexthedismissalproceduresarebecausethis implies
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